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Abstract. In this paper, we study a vintage capital model under a
general equilibrium setting. In this model ﬁrms can invest not only on new
vintage capital goods, but also on existing ones. We show that the capital
accumulation is a single hum-shape function, featuring slow technology
diﬀusion.
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1 Introduction
Vintage capital models, which were launched in the early 60s’, have become
increasingly popular in the economic literature. These models provide an
approach for the analysis of investment volatility. The main diﬀerence be-
tween vintage capital model and the standard neoclassical growth model lies
in the fact that in the former, new technological progress is embodied in new
equipment, which gives rise to an endogenous process of creative destruc-
tion. Furthermore, as mentioned by Boucekkine et al (1997) and Benhabib
et al (1991), optimal investment paths are no longer monotonic in contrast
to the standard neoclassical growth model. In vintage capital models, the
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1replacement of the old equipment is an economic decision, allowing for a
formalization in the Shumpeterean vein. This replacement decision induces
non-monotonic optimal paths for investment according to an echo princi-
ple(Boucekkine et al (1997) and Benhabib et al (1991)).
In the framework of Boucekkine et al (1996, 1997), the approach is purely
theoretical. A common assumption to these models is that investment is only
allowed for the new vintage capital, a traditional assumption in the litera-
ture (see Malcomson (1975)).As a result, there is immediate new technology
diﬀusion.
However this assumption is not realistic. Firms use to invest in older cap-
ital goods. The main reason behind this is technology adoption. Technology
adoption is costly in that it requires some speciﬁc vintage capital goods and
involves learning or installation costs. Learning eﬀects entail the concept of
costly technology adoption, which motivates the investment in dominated
technologies. Parente (1994) argued that the ﬁrms may be prevented from
adopting new technologies as this supposes a loss in human capital (vin-
tage speciﬁcity of human capital). However Parente did not work out this
ideas in a vintage capital model. He only conducted a steady state analysis.
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) also combined vintage and learning eﬀects
in a computable dynamic general equilibrium model but they did so in a
mostly ad-hoc way. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) explored the same idea in
a stochastic framework, but in partial equilibrium setting.
Is it possible to build a general equilibrium vintage capital model, in which
investment is allowed in both new and existing vintage capital goods? This
idea was already considered by Barucci and Gozzi (1996, 2001) and Fe-
ichtinger, Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2001). In a ﬂexible mathematical frame-
work (McKendrick systems), they studied the replacement-adoption problem
within a partial equilibrium setting, where capital accumulation is captured
by a ﬁrst order partial diﬀerential equation.
We will extend the above work to a general equilibrium setting. Pre-
cisely, we will consider an optimal growth model. In fact, the role of cen-
tral planner maybe is crucial in technology adoption. As emphasized by
Williamson(1971), “in the early 19th century, United State encouraged a
faster scrapping of capital in favor of technologically superior equipment in
the textile industry and then obtained rapid productivity growth in that in-
dustry ”(See also Bardhan and Priale (1996)). Very recently, in the textile
industry in China, though with low productivity technology and old tech-
nique, “in the early 1980s, due to large demand on domestic market, the
2textile industry produced unusually good proﬁt1”. From the long run point
of view, at the end of 1990s, the textile industry of China still decided to
adopt new techniques and replace the old ones step by step by oﬀering some
subsidies.
In order to establish the optimal investment rules in such situation, cen-
tral planner has to consider two things: (i) how much to invest in existing
vintage capital goods (improvement in the quality of investment), and how
much to invest in new vintage capital goods (expanding variety of invest-
ment). Our model considers such a trade-oﬀ.
Among our results, we obtain that the stock of capital is a single hum-
shape with respect to the vintage age for any ﬁxed time t. In another words,
there is slow technology diﬀusion.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, a vintage capital model is
introduced under a general equilibrium setting, while Section 3 shows Pon-
tryagin’s condition and its suﬃciency. Section 4 provides the analysis of
equilibria, technology diﬀusion and investment path.
2 The Model
Suppose population is constant, labor market is competitive and there is
only one ﬁnal good, which can be assigned to consumption or investment
and plays the role of numeraire.
Moreover, assume that the central planner solves a standard maximiza-




























1See China textile industry: Past, Present and Future, by China State Textile Industry
Bureau
3with t ≥ 0, c(t)a n dy(t) present per-capita consumption and output respec-
tively, ρ(> 0) is the time preference parameter, v is the oldest vintage capital
still in use, that is, the lifetime of the vintage capital goods, and a(t,v)i sa
known function of productivity of capital and satisﬁes the following condi-
tions,
Assumption A
1◦ a(t,v) ≥ 0, for any t ≥ 0, v ≥ 0;
2◦ ∂a(t,v)
∂v
< 0, for any t ≥ 0. That is, ”young” vintage capital goods are
more eﬃcient than old ones.
Moreover, k(t,v) is the stock of per-capita capital goods of a given vin-
tage age v(≥ 0) at time t, which satisﬁes the following ﬁrst order partial
diﬀerential equation2

   






= i(t,v) − δk(t,v),t ∈ (0,∞),v∈ (0,v],
k(t,0) = i0(t),t∈ (0,∞),
k(0,v)=k0(v),v∈ (0,v],
(4)
where i(t,v) is investment in the existing vintage capital v at time t,t h a t
is, the process of improving the quality of investment, δ(≥ 0) is the natural
depreciation rate of capital, i0(t) is investment in new vintage capital goods
at time t, that is, expanding variety of investment, and k0(v)i ss t o c ko f









in another words, initially in this economy there are some equipments that
can be used for some periods. Moreover, we assume investments are nonneg-
ative (i(t,v) ≥ 0,i0(t) ≥ 0) .
2The partial diﬀerential equation expresses the transition equation generalized to the
classical dynamical system ˙ k(t)=i(t) − δk(t). From the vintage capital point of view,
during time period  t at given time t, for given vintage v, the stock of capital will change
from k(t,v)t ok(t+  t,v + λ  t), where constant λ ≥ 0 describes the relation between
time t and vintage capital v. Simple manipulations allows us to impose λ =1 .
4The coeﬃcients l(t,v),l 0(t,), α(t,v), α0(t) are known functions, where
l(t,v),l 0(t) are operating (or learning, or unit) costs, α(t,v)a n dα0(t)a r e
adoption costs with respect to existing and new vintage capital goods. Fol-
lowing the tradition in the investment literature, adoption costs are speciﬁed
as quadratic functions of gross investment. Here, we assume that,
Assumption C For every v ≥ 0 and for a ﬁxed  >0, there are









v→0l(t,v),α 0 ≥ lim
v→0α(t,v) ≥  . (7)
Assumption C means that there are at least positive adoption costs for
new and existing vintage capital goods ( inequalities (5)). Moreover, ‘young’
vintage capital goods are more expensive than ‘old’ ones (inequalities (6)),
and naturally, new vintage capital goods are the most expensive ( see (7)).
Remark Obviously, from (4), i(t,v) does not continue up to the bound-
ary condition i0(t)a tv = 0. As a result, the solution of (4) for v>0d o e s
not continue up to the boundary. Hence, this process has no accumulation
of new capital goods.
Let k(·,v):[ 0 ,∞) → L2((0,v];R), where L2((0,v];R) means space of







Formally, (4) can be written as
 
k (t)=Ak(t)+i(t)+δ0i0(t),t ∈ (0,∞)
k(0) = k0,
(8)
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3 Investment Strategy and Pontryagin Con-
dition
In this section, we study the investment strategy depending on cost functions.
Before introducing the value function, let us denote that I{v≥t} is an indicator











   v
0
(ak(τ,v) − li(τ,v) − αi









<q (τ,v),k t − (Ak(τ)+i(τ)+δ0i0(τ)) >v e
−ρτdτ,
where < ·,· > is the inter product. The ﬁrst order conditions of the above



















From the above analysis, we have
Proposition 1 (Pontryagin Condition and Optimal Investment
Strategy) For any given investment strategy i(t,v),i 0(t), the costate equa-








limt→∞ q(t,v)e−ρt =0 ,
(13)











−(ρ+δ)(τ−v)a(τ − v + t,τ)dτ.
(14)
Under assumption A and C, we obtain that, at time t, there exists a unique
optimal investment strategy (i∗(t,v),i ∗
0(t)) for the optimal control problem.
This strategy is given by (11) and (12). Furthermore, the optimal investment
strategy does not depend on the initial value of capital, but on all ‘prices’, in-
cluding shadow price of capital, unit and adoption costs of gross investment.
It is straightforward that the shadow price of capital, q(t,v) depends on
the time preference of consumers, depreciation rate of capital, and on the
productivity of capital, which is important for the investment strategy.
Solving partial diﬀerential state equations (4) or (8), and assuming that









with t ∧ v =m i n {t,v}.
From an economic point of view, if the operating time of some equipment
is not as old as the age of that equipment( or operating the equipment before
7it is obsolete), then before the initial store of capital is scrapped out of the
market, there is always some store of capital left in this economy.
However for t>v , it could be possible that investment in any vintage is
too costly, that is, from (11), (12), for any v ∈ (0,v],
i(t,v)=0 ,i 0(t)=0 .





In other words, too costly vintage investment will not allow us to implement
the interior solution. Even if the economy is at the interior solution, it still
can end up in a corner solution–poverty trap. So we need to impose some
conditions to avoid the corner solution. In particular, we assume that the
‘prices ’ satisfy the following conditions.
Assumption I In the following, 1◦ always holds and at least 2◦ or 3◦
hold as well, where
1◦










−(ρ+δ)τa(τ + t,τ)dτ ≥ l0(t);











−(ρ+δ)τa(τ + t,τ)dτ > l0(t).
Assumption I says that if for all the existing vintage capital goods, the
remaining lifetime productivity discounted by the time preference of con-
sumers and depreciation rate of capital is not higher than the operating cost
l(t,v), v ∈ (0,v], then we must have new vintage capital goods, with much
8higher productivity and the earning from this new equipment is more than
the operating cost ( 2◦ and 3◦). Moreover any kind of equipment adjustment
has ﬁnite adoption costs and any equipment’s earning is not less than the
operating cost(1◦).











−(ρ+δ)(τ−v)a(τ − v + t,τ)dτ = l(t,v),
because of our exogenous constant lifetime assumption, that is, positive con-
stant v. When the equipments are no longer young, and if the operating
costs are the same, after discounting the productivity, the earning can only
compensate the operating cost and no more left 3 . If this is the case, either
we have to invest in the new capital goods with higher productivity to replace
the old ones, or adjust the assumption of lifetime v, or both. In this present
work, we consider the ﬁrst case.
Note that Assumption I is similar to the ‘piecewise continuous’ assump-
tion in Boucekkine et al (1997), and our assumption on the initial condi-
tion (4.a) is similar to the ‘no hole’ assumption in Boucekkine et al (1997).
Actually this productivity assumption is a key assumption that drives the
economy, and provides the incentive to invest in new and more productivity
capital goods. Hence, in developed economies, investing in new and scrap-
ping old vintage capital goods are necessary to keep the economy developing.
Investing in the new and young equipments, though they are more costly than
old ones, is a kind of saving for the total economy in long run perspective.
Proposition 2 (Necessary and suﬃcient condition) Suppose that
Assumptions A and C hold, moreover if Assumption I also holds, then the
above Pontryagin conditions are not only necessary, but also suﬃcient for
the original optimal control problem.
The proof of suﬃciency is given in Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption I hold. For any given investment strat-
egy i(t,v),i 0(t), there exists a unique solution of the capital accumulation
equation (4), given by (15).
3That is the case in the previous footnote, λ>1, which means that this vintage capital
goods quickly go out of date.
9Corollary 1 Productivity of capital has a positive eﬀect on investment
strategy, while the unit and adoption costs have negative eﬀects.
In fact, the above two diﬀerent directions eﬀects drive the central plan-
ner to consider both sides(productivity and costs) of the investment. If the
productivity a(t,v)( v ∈ [0,v)), is homogenous for all types of vintage cap-
ital goods, then the planner would like to choose the old vintage capital
goods, since with the same productivity, they cost less. But then this econ-
omy loses its engine of development. On the other hand, if we assume that
l(t,v)=0 ,(v>0), and keep α(t,v) the same as before, that is, for existing
vintage capital goods, there is no learning cost, the planner would like to take
the youngest vintage capital, which is more eﬃcient, and scrape the old ones
at once. But as we know in reality, this is not the case. The eﬀect of l(t,v)
can be compensated by increasing the adoption cost (that is the reason, we
can assume that l(t,v) is nonnegative, rather than strictly positive).
For l0(t)a n dα0(t), similar interpretations can be made.
Note If in one economy, there is only one market for new capital goods,
we can assume α(t,v)=0 ,α0(t) = 0, and l(t,v) ≥  >0, l0(t) ≥  >0,
for any t>0, and keep all the other conditions in Assumption C, then we
can rebuild the similar results of Malcomson (1975) with exogenous constant
scrapping rule, in the sense of general equilibrium setting.
Furthermore choosing the optimal investment strategies above, there is
an optimal capital accumulation.
Corollary 3 Suppose that Assumption A, C and I hold, for a given
productivity of capital a(t,v), with optimal investment strategy (i∗,i ∗
0), given














In this section, we study the properties around the equilibria. For the ex-
ogenous cost functions and productivity of capital, there could be two cases,
that is, time independent and time dependent.
Yorukoglu (1998, P552) noted in his paper that, IBM introduced its pen-
10tium PCs in the early 1990s at the same price as it introduced its 286 PC in
the 1980s. Therefore it took less than a decade for the computing technol-
ogy to improve on the order of 20 years in terms of both speed and memory
capacities, without increasing the cost. In this case, we may think that
the exogenous cost functions are time independent, except the productivity,
which is an increasing function with respect to time t (see also Feichtinger,
Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2001) ).
In this present paper, we will follow Solow’s belief that the technology is
exponentially increasing with time t,t h a ti s ,a(t,v)=ea1ta2(v), where func-
tion a2(v) satisﬁes Assumption A and 0 <a 1 <ρ (to assure the convergence
of the integral). But all the cost functions only depend on the type of vintage
v, rather than time t. Hence, we assume that l(t,v)=l(v),α(t,v)=α(v) for
any t ≥ 0a n dv ≥ 0, and l0,α 0 are constants. Moreover the other conditions
in Assumption C and I hold. Simple calculation from (11), (12), (13) and
(15), lead to the shadow price of capital, optimal investments as follows,

       




















































∗(t − τ,v − τ)dτ, t > v.
(18)
By the assumption of time independence of cost functions, it is easy to
see that in (16) and (17), both the shadow prices of capital and investments
in the new and existing vintage capital goods are increasing functions with
respect to time t for any ﬁxed vintage capital. But the increasing investment
in vintage capital goods does not match the classical results in the literature
( see Boucekkine et al (1997), and Benhabib et al (1991)), they are rather
consistent with the neoclassical growth model. The key reason is that we









































Figure 1: Left: Monotonic with time. Right: Non-monotonic with time
negative eﬀects compared to the positive eﬀects of the productivity of capital.
It is not diﬃcult to see ( from (17)) that, if we also assume that the costs are
increasing functions of time t (as Solow (1959), Barucci and Gozzi (2001) ),
then we lose the monotonicity of investment, see Example 1.
Example 1 Taking δ =0 .06, ρ =0 .04, lifetime v = 10, initial capital
k0(v)=1 −0.1v, new equipment costs are constants with respect to time, that
is, α0 =0 .5, l0 =3 .98. Moreover in the left ﬁgure, we take existing equipment
costs are time independent, α(t,v)=0 .5e−0.1v and l(t,v)=0 .398(10 − v),
but productivity function depends on time a(t,v)=4 e0.01te−0.1v, we got
monotonic investment path and monotonic capital accumulation. In the right
Figure, we take α(t,v)=0 .125e0.03t−0.1v, l(t,v)=0 .398(10−v)a n da(t,v)=
4e0.01te−0.1v, then it is easy to see that there is no monotonic investment path
and also the capital accumulation is not monotonic.
Actually, under the assumption of time dependent productivity and time
independent cost functions, for the capital accumulation, our results are
richer than in the literature so far. For existing vintage capital goods, if
















0(v − t)] + e




One can prove that for any ﬁxed v>0, and t ≤ v, the second term in
(19) is non-negative ( see Appendix A2) , and the ﬁrst and the last terms
are positive. As a result, the investment in the existing vintage capital has
positive eﬀect on the capital accumulation, but with time passing, the old
12equipments storing slows down the capital accumulation process.







0(t − v) > 0,











−δτ∂i∗(t − τ,v − τ)
∂t
dτ ≥ 0, (20)
That is, investment in the new or young existing vintage capital goods will
increase capital capacity.
We conclude the above analysis with Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 For a given ﬁxed vintage capital goods and for given ex-
ponential productivity of capital and time independent cost functions, there
is a unique long-run optimal investment strategy, stationary steady state of
capital accumulation and shadow price of capital, given by (17), (18) and
(16).
Furthermore, there is a monotonic investment path for new and existing
vintage capital goods. Investing on existing vintage capital will always in-
crease the capital accumulation, but the storing of old vintage capital goods
will slow down this accumulation procedure.
Let us now study the long-run steady state, that is t>v . We assume
that people do not invest too much on the old equipments, that is,
di∗(t,v)
dv
≤ 0, for any v ∈ (0,v]. (21)
Proposition 5 With time dependent productivity and time independent
cost functions, consider a vintage capital good, which initially does not exist
in the market (that is, t>v ). Assume that there are vintage capital goods
markets and (21) holds, then with the depreciation rate of capital satisfying
0 <δ<1, we have that there exists a benchmark age v∗ ∈ (0,v), such that,
at v∗, the investment in this vintage capital good compensates the depreciated
capital (i∗(t,v∗)=δk∗(t,v∗) ). Moreover, younger than this age, the optimal
capital accumulation is an increasing function with respect to v, but older
than this age, the capital accumulation is a decreasing function of age. In
other words, there is a single hum-shape of capital accumulation with respect













































Figure 2: Single hum-shape of capital accumulation with age
Furthermore, the optimal accumulation of vintage capital goods is increas-
ing in terms of technology level a1, and decreasing with respect to δ,ρ,α(v),l(v),l 0
and α0.
Proof From (18), it is easily to check that the optimal capital accumu-
lation k∗(t,v) is a decreasing function with respect to all cost functions l0,
l(v), α0,a n dα(v). As a result, any kind of increase in the cost functions will
hurt the capital accumulation. Also, it is not diﬃcult to check that ∂k∗
∂a1 > 0,
hence technology improvement will increase the capital capacity.
See Appendix 3 for the other proof. .
Remark As mentioned by Malcomson (1975), a ﬁrm buys only most
recent vintage of equipment, (that is, only v → 0+ can happen), then there
is immediate technology diﬀusion. In our model, there is a market, where
vintage equipments are sold, therefore, there is not necessary immediate tech-
nology diﬀusion, because of cost or information delay.
Example 2 We take the same functions as in Example 1, with the only
change is the direction of axels.
From Figure 2, it is easy to see that there is single hum-shape of capital
accumulation with respect to age in the two cases. Moreover at steady state,
there are less old equipments and new vintage capital goods than young ones.
Old equipments are no longer eﬃcient enough, so they are scrapped out of
the market. But the new ones are too expensive or need some time to be
accepted by the market. Initially, there are some old equipments on the
market, but with time passing, they are outdated and being scrapped oﬀ.




































Figure 3: Prolong lifetime of vintage capital goods
study the eﬀect of constant exogenous lifetime of vintage capital goods on
capital accumulation and consumption.
It is easy to see that both q(t,v)a n dk(t,v) are also functions of lifetime
v. Then we can write k(t,v),q(t,v)a sk(t,v;v),q(t,v;v). Derivative q(t,v;v)
and q(t,0;v) with respect to lifetime v, and substituting them into the partial
derivative,
∂k(t,v;v)















Hence increasing the lifetime of equipment will lead to increase the capital
accumulation– less scrapping will save some capital. However, this procedure













×[−(δ + ρ − a1)a2(v)+a 
2(v)] < 0,
due to the fact that, a1 <ρand Assumption A of a2.
As a conclusion, we have the following result.
Proposition 6 Slowing down the exogenous scrapping rule will not
reduce capital capacity, but keeping on using old vintage equipment will hinder
the development of the economy. Hence, replacing the old equipment by the
new and more eﬃcient one is a process of creative destruction.
Actually, this fact was already noticed by Salter(1960), where he men-
tioned
15“In fact there is some evidence to suggest that one of the chief reasons for
Anglo-American productivity diﬀerences lies in standards of obsolescence. It
is a common theme in Productivity Mission Reports that the productivity of
the best plants in the United Kingdom is comparable with that of the best
plants in the United States, and that the diﬀerence lies in a much higher
proportion of plants employing outmoded methods in the United Kingdom–
a much greater ‘tail’ of low-productivity plants. Such a situation is consistent
with a higher standard of obsolescence in the United State which follows from
a higher level of real wages (page 72–73).”
Proposition 7 For given time dependent productivity and time inde-
pendent cost functions, there is unique long-run stationary steady state of




























Moreover Assumption I and a1 <ρare suﬃcient conditions to achieve the
interior solution of the above optimal consumption.
Furthermore, increasing the operating (or learning) costs, will harm the
optimal consumption, while the adoption costs of new and existing vintage
capital goods have ambiguous eﬀects on consumption.
Remark The last statement of the above proposition explains the reason
why sometime the new technologies are more expensive, but people still would
like to invest in them. Also it shows the hint to the central planner that some
time subsidies are necessary in the long run.
Proof By substituting optimal investment and optimal capital accumu-
lation (17) and (18) into the consumption function (3),we can get (22).
The proof of admissible consumption c(t) > 0 is given in Appendix A4.
In that proof, we can see that Assumption I and a1 <ρare suﬃcient
conditions of interior solution of consumption (in fact not only for optimal
consumption).
In the following we will study how the costs aﬀect the optimal consump-
tion.

































from which we can see that the sign of the above expression is not clear. As
a result there are ambiguous eﬀects of the adoption cost on the consumption.
But it is easy to check that if a1 = 0, that is, the technology does not improve
with time t, then increasing the adoption cost will hurt consumption. The
reason of this is obvious: since the new technology does not improve the
productivity, there is no incentive to introduce the new ones, which are costly.
But if the technological process increasing with time 0 <a 1 <ρ ,i tc o u l db e
the case that even increasing the adoption cost, the investment in this vintage
capital good still can beneﬁt the consumers, because the productivity is high
enough to compensate the extra cost. But on the other hand, because of
the embodied technology, as we see in Proposition 5, technology adoption
will lead to have more and more capital accumulation and also increase the
shadow price of capital. As a result, ﬁrms would like to invest more in
the new and more eﬃcient equipments, which leads to the conclusion that
consumers could aﬀord less consumption goods. Hence, strictly increasing
the technology level maybe not beneﬁcial to the consumers.















By 1◦ in Assumption I, it is easy to see that the diﬀerence on the right hand
side of the above equation leads to ∂c
∂l0 ≤ 0. Hence, the operating cost of new
vintage capital always has negative eﬀects on the consumption.
In order to study the eﬀect of costs of existing equipment on the con-













































Thus, increasing the operating cost of existing vintage will diminish con-
sumption.
For the eﬀect of the adoption cost of the existing vintage capital goods,


















∗(t − τ + v,v) − l(v))dτ
 
dv,
which has a similar eﬀect on the adoption cost of new equipment. 
5 Conclusion
In this paper, under a general equilibrium setting of a vintage capital goods
model, with a simple linear utility function and nearly linear output func-
tion, we obtain that there is slow technology diﬀusion rather than immediate
diﬀusion, if ﬁrms can invest not only in new vintage capital goods, but also
in existing ones. Moreover, keeping using old vintage capital goods will not
reduce capital capacity, but it could hinder the development of the economy.
Furthermore, increasing adoption costs will undermine capital accumulation,
but it may be welfare improving.

















































then the above (i∗(τ,v),i ∗
0(τ)) is optimal for the original optimal control
problem. In fact, we have
∂F3
∂i
= q(τ,v) − l(τ,v) − 2α(τ,v)i(τ,v),
∂F4
∂i0
= q(τ,v) − l0(τ) − 2α(τ,v)i0(τ),
and
∂2F3




= −2α(τ,v) < 0,













19and in the ﬁrst formula at least one of the inequality strictly holds, hence
F3(τ,v;i)+F4(τ,v;i0) is strictly concave with respect to (i,i0). As a result








which is equivalent to (11) and (12).
Appendix 2 (Proof )




0(v − t) ≥ 0. (A2.1)
In fact, if k 
0(t) ≥ 0, then the above always true. First, we assume that
k 
0(t) ≤ 0, t ∈ (0,v), and δk0(v − t)+k 
0(v − t) ≤ 0, then integrating for t in









0(v − t)dt = k0(0) − k0(v) < 0,
which is a contradiction. Second, let consider that there exits an interval
[α,β] ⊂ (0,v), such that, when t ∈ [α,β], there is k 
0(t) ≤ 0a n dδk0(v −t)+
k 
0(v − t) ≤ 0. In fact using the same argument as above, we can obtain the
contradiction by the fact that k0 is a decreasing function in [α,β].
As a result, even if k0(t) is not monotone, we still have that (A2.1) holds.
Appendix 3 (Proof of Proposition 5)
In the case t>v , for any ﬁxed t, derivative the second equation in (18) with






































































q(t,0) ≥ 0. (A3.3)










q(t − v + τ,τ)dτ
 
,
we can easily get the following ordinary diﬀerential equation,
 






Solving the above equation, we get
F(v)= F(0) + e
−(δ+a1)v






















+ F(0) ≤ i
∗(t,v) − δk
∗(t,v). (A3.4)


















21because of Assumption I, and at least one of i0(t − v)a n di(t − τ,v − τ)a r e
strictly positive.
Combining (A3.3),(A3.4) and (A3.5), we have that there exists a bench-

























2α0q(t,0) is independent of v for any time t>0, therefore, k∗(t,v)i s
single hum-shape function of v.












It is easy to check that
g(0) ≥ 0,g (1) ≥ 0,














Appendix 4 (Proof of Proposition 7)
We prove that under conditions of the Proposition, we have that c(t) >
0,∀t>0.



































































































by the fact that ρ>a 1 and q(t,0) ≥ l0, due to Assumption I.
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Consider Assumption I, at least one of the above two inequalities is a
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